Toward a Principled Approach to the
Distribution of Global Wealth: An
Impartial Solution to the
Dispute Over Seabed
Manganese Nodules*
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Throughout the dispute over the allocation of seabed manganese nodules, each interest group has relied on disingenuous legal
positions. This Article discusses the major economic and political
conflicts that underlie the seabed dispute, argues that no legal position is compelling, and urges the conferees to distribute manganese nodules according to a rigorously defined impartialscheme.
Such action will provide the impartial legal precedent urgently
required to avoid more serious conflicts over the distribution of
global wealth.
INTRODUCTION

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS II1)1 remains burdened by the inability of its First
* The Author thanks Professor Bruce A. Ackerman, Professor W. Michael
Reisman, Kenneth T. Roth, and Edna L Scott for their help in the preparation of
this Article.
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1. The first session of UNCLOS was not specifically called until December 18,
1972, when the General Assembly unanimously adopted GA Res. 3029 A, 27 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 21, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972), reprinted in 2 S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT 3. The law of the sea conference
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Committee (Committee I)2 to negotiate a legal regime governing
the peaceful exploitation of manganese nodules, potato-shaped
concretions of seawater minerals found in deposits on the ocean
floor.3 Committee I has taken great strides toward reaching a ne-

gotiating text that would accommodate the often conflicting interests of the developed nations, which use the minerals contained
in the nodules, and of the less developed countries (LDCs), which
include many countries currently exporting these minerals from
terrestrial deposits. These two interest groups, however, have
proffered three solutions to the seabed nodule dispute, each more
extreme than the current negotiating text. 4 First, the United
had been conceived five years earlier, however, when the General Assembly decided "to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to study the peaceful uses of the sea-

bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." G.A. Res. 2340,
22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 14, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967), reprinted in 1 S. ODA,
supra,at 33. The Ad Hoc Committee achieved full Committee status in 1968. GA.
Res. 2467, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 15, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968), reprinted in 1
S. ODA, supra,at 34. In 1970, the General Assembly decided to convene "a conference [in 1973] on the law of the sea which would deal with the establishment of an
equitable international regime... for the area and the resources of the sea-bed
(and a broad range of other issues] ... ." G.A. Res. 2750 C, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 28) 26, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprintedin 1 S. ODA, supra, at 48.
2. The substantive discussions at UNCLOS have been structured around
three main committees. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/29 (1974). Committee I's concern
is an international regime for the seabed, Committee H addresses general aspects
of the law of the sea, and Committee I focuses on marine environment, research,
and technology transfer. Id. Although this Article will not discuss the work of
Committees H and I, it should be recognized that UNCLOS hopes to produce a
comprehensive treaty, one governing every aspect of the law of the sea. This Article will focus on seabed mining, an issue that has proven to be so intractable that
many observers have advocated separating it from the bulk of UNCLOS in order
to enhance prospects for ratifying a treaty, albeit a less than comprehensive one.
See, e.g., Smith, The Seabed Negotiation and the Law of the Sea Conference-

Ready for A Divorce?, 18 VA. J. INr'L L. 43 (1977).
At the seventh session of UNCLOS M, in the Spring of 1978, seven negotiating
groups were established to resolve outstanding issues. The first three were
designed to address various seabed mining issues. Law of the Sea Conference Status Report Summer 1978: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Int'l Relations,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Status Report Summer 1978]
(statement of U.S. Ambassador to UNCLOS Elliot Richardson).
3. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvicE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., OCEAN MANGANODULES 3 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES].

NESE

See generally id. at 1-12 (describing nodules' composition, formation, and geographic distribution).
4. On April 18, 1975, the Conference in plenary session decided to request
from the chairman of each of the three main committees a "single negotiating
text" covering the subjects entrusted to his committee. In May, 1975, these three
reports were joined as the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/WP.8 (1975), reprintedin 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERrALS 682 (1975). In July,

1977, the Conference produced the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATEIALS 1108

(1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT]. Part XI and Annexes II and I of the ICNT,
which contain the work of Committee I, were drafted by Paul Bamela Engo of the
Cameroon and allegedly do not reflect the positions reached during the negotiations. The text apparently distorts many provisions in favor of the LDCs.
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States Congress currently is considering a bill5 that would encourage the unilateral exploitation of the nodules by the technologically capable consortia that are based exclusively in
developed countries. 6 The second and third solutions derive from
the LDC's belief that unilateral exploitation violates the legal notion that the nodules are the common heritage of mankind and

therefore are not subject to unilateral exploitation. The LDCs
prefer either continued negotiation, which perpetuates their profits from terrestrial mining, or, finally, a solution entailing a significant redistribution of technology to the LDCs.
These three extreme self-interested solutions are inherently unstable. First, unilateral mining would create a potentially violent
atmosphere that undoubtedly would strain North-South relations.7 Second, the LDCs' strategy of continued negotiation
merely increases the likelihood of unilateral mining. Congress
apparently believes that the consortia will not invest in seabed
mining technology if conference delays continue. Because it also
believes that mining is necessary for our economic well-being,
Congress probably will approve unilateral mining legislation if
the LDCs continue their strategy of delay.8 Finally, a large redisOceanographyMiscellaneous-Part2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,95th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 41-42 (1977-1978) [hereinafter cited as Oceanography Miscellaneous] (statement of Elliot Richardson) (asserting that ICNT "deviates markedly" from negotiated proposals). For the most recent versions of the ICNT, see ICNT Rev. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/WVP.10/Rev.1 (1979), discussed in The Status of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on
ForeignAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Status Report Spring 1979] (reprinting U.S. Delegation Report from Spring, 1979 session of
UNCLOS); and ICNT Rev. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2 (1980), discussed
in U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Law of the Sea Negotiations, U.S. Delegation
Report, Ninth Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, New
York, Feb. 27-Ap. 4, 1980 (copy on file at the San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Spring 1980 Delegation Report].
5. H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 493, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
(passed by the Senate Dec. 14, 1979).
6. There are eight consortia, four "major" ones with significant participation
by U.S. corporations, and four minor ones. Law of the Sea. Hearingson H.R. 2759
and H.R. 3268 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 155-59 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Law of the Sea] (Marne A. Dubs).
7. Law of the Sea, supra note 6, at 8-9 (Elliot Richardson); Hardy, The implicationsof alternativesolutionsfor regulatingthe exploitation of seabed minerals,
31 Ir"L ORGANIZATION 313, 340 (1977).
8. Murphy, The Politics of Manganese Nodules: InternationalConsiderations
and Domestic Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 531, 547-52 (1979). This belief is
noted in the unilateral mining legislation itself. H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.

tributive authority will have difficulty coercing the redistribution
of technology.9
A problem more fundamental than the instability of the extreme solutions is the orientation of the negotiations around selfinterested bargaining positions. This Article will argue that Committee I should not settle the seabed dispute with even a moderate compromise if that solution is derived from negotiations in
which all parties bargain from self-interested perspectives. Such
a solution would be unstable because the ultimate outcome would
reflect current political, economic, and military power. While this
sufficed for stability in the past, today's constant alterations in the
balance of power,O coupled with the growing disjunction between
military power and the ability to maintain world order," make
such a bargained solution inherently unstable.
§ 2(10) (1979). The Administration shares this belief. Testimony of Ambassador
Elliot L. Richardson before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs 3 (April 17, 1980)
(pretestimony State Dept. transcript, on file at San Diego Law Review) (hereinafter cited as Foreign Affairs Testimony]. However, the Administration had asked
the Foreign Affairs Committee to suspend temporarily its consideration of H.R.
2759 to avoid jeopardizing the potentially fruitful February, 1980, Ninth Session of
UNCLOS. Id. at 2. The Administration feared imminent Congressional passage of
the bill and resulting LDC resentment. Indeed the bill's predecessor in the 95th
Congress passed overwhelmingly in the House, H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) (passed by the House Jul. 26, 1978) and simply ran out of time in the Senate. This session, House passage is equally likely while the Senate already passed
its version. S. 493, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979) (passed by the Senate Dec. 14, 1979).
The House Foreign Affairs Committee cooperated with the Administration and
in fact the Ninth Session of UNCLOS was productive. See Spring 1980 Delegation
Report, supra note 4. The Administration now favors passage of the unilateral
mining legislation if it is amended to reflect a compromise the Administration
claims to have achieved among the consortia and LDCs. That compromise sets
January 1, 1988, as the first date for commercial production under the bill. Foreign
Affairs Testimony, supra, at 3-4. The legislation had permitted production commencing July 1, 1982. S. 493, supra, at § 101(c) (1) (D); H.R. 2759, supra, at
§ 103(c) (1) (C). The LDCs apparently believe that the additional years are sufficient time to achieve an agreement at UNCLOS and ratification of the Convention.
At this writing the Foreign Affairs Committee just approved without dissent a version of H.R. 2759 that accomodates the Administration's request for postponing
commercial mining until 1988. Other House committees also are expected to
amend their versions accordingly and the legislation is regarded as "noncontroversiaL" Wall St. J., May 9, 1980, at 23, col. 1.
9. Law of the Sea, supra note 6, at 216 (Phillip Hawkins) (unsure his consortium could legally transfer its technology); id. at 170 (Marne A. Dubs) (forced
technology transfer may preclude private investment in ocean mining). But see
Spring 1980 Delegation Report, supra note 4, at 9-14 (new ICNT Rev. 2 rules governing technology transfer appear substantially workable).
10. E.g., the rise of OPEC and the use of one nation, one vote in international
fora. See text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
11. For example, in November, 1979, Iranian students were able to neutralize
U.S. military power through a combination of hostage-taking and the U.S fear that
armed action would alienate other OPEC countries. See R. TucKER, THE INEQUAL=TY OF

NATIONS 80-95 (1977) (current disjunction between military power and abil-

ity to maintain "order," coupled with absence of legal norms for resolving conflicts,
produces tremendous potential for economic and armed disruptions).

[voL. 17: 557, 1980]

Impartial Solution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Because bargaining is more difficult when the participants are
numerous and possess relatively equal power, this type of negotiated solution is rapidly losing its utility in the global arena. Accordingly, western Committee I delegates12 should not approach
the negotiations with the sole objective of furthering short term
western interests. Instead, they should negotiate from a moral
and principled position sufficiently general to be employed in
other similar situations. This would facilitate the development of
a moral and consistent western approach to questions of wealth
redistribution. Such an approach will be useful in the future because the redistributive problems looming on the horizon, such as
the efficacy of the New World Economic Order (NWEO) 13 and the
just distribution of the world's resources, will be significantly
more volatile, and thus less susceptible to a reasoned and peaceful solution, than is the problem of allocating manganese nodules.
Fortunately, a principled approach to the Committee I dispute is
feasible precisely because the problem of equitable distribution
presented by seabed nodules is one of the least painful distributive questions on the international horizon.' 4 Establishing a principled stand is urgently required because the enormous demands
that the LDCs are making on developed country wealth5 threaten
to trigger potentially violent confrontations 6 that possibly could
be averted if the developed nations' position were based on a gen7
eral principle rather than on short term self-interest.
12. While this Article addresses western delegates, many of its suggestions
are equally applicable to all delegates.
13. The series of demands and resolutions made by LDCs for reorganizing the
world economy to close the gap between rich and poor nations is often called the
quest for a New World Economic Order. See text accompanying notes 40-55 infra.
14. Manganese nodules present a problem more akin to the distribution of
new wealth than a redistribution of existing, titled wealth. Because initial distributions are less painful than redistributions, the atmosphere surrounding the nodule debate is less volatile than the atmosphere potentially surrounding future
questions of redistribution.
15. E.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (Castro calls on wealthy imperialist nations to pay $300 billion to develop poor countries).
16. See notes 90-91 infra.
17. For example, while one might argue that the November, 1979, situation at
the U.S. Embassy in Teheran could not be resolved on a rational basis, there were
indications that a major component of the anti-U.S. feeling (distinct from the antiShah feeling) was the perception that the U.S. acts only according to its own selfinterest. When the U.S. froze Iranian assets in the U.S., for example, a prominent
member of the Revolutionary Council proclaimed that the action showed "that
laws are made only for the interests of the United States and it breaks them when
it feels that it will be hurt." N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, § A, at 16, col. 5.

This Article will demonstrate how the western Committee I delegates can use the session to begin constructing a moral and principled negotiating stance to replace the current approach that is
based primarily on self-interest.18 First it discusses the economic
conflict between LDCs that currently produce the minerals found
in seabed nodules and the developed countries that both consume
those minerals and have the technology to exploit the seabed. After demonstrating the critical importance of the seabed nodule
debate in the campaign for a New World Economic Order, this Article continues by arguing that the law of the seabed, which is
used disingenuously by both sides to support their self-serving
claims to seabed entitlements, does not provide a convincing resolution of the nodule debate. Instead, the Article maintains that
this legal void should be filled by articulated principles sufficiently general19 to be useful in resolving future disputes over the
proper distribution of global wealth. Specifically, it suggests that
the law of the seabed should be derived from philosophical theories of distributive justice. Finally, these theories are used to provide insight into the structure of a just solution of the seabed
nodule problem and into the components of a more equitable
world economic order.
THE SEABED MANGANESE NODULES DEBATE

The Committee I debate is not a classic struggle over a scarce
resource but is both a battle by national actors for the role of mineral producer and a critical test of the emerging New World Eco18. Self-interest in the seabed nodule debate is often disguised by undefined
terms intended to lend moral weight to self-serving arguments. See, e.g., ICNT,
supra note 4, art. 151(9) (advocating an "equitable sharing" of seabed bounty that
gives special consideration to developing, landlocked, geographically disadvantaged, and colonized countries); Id. art. 153(3) (regime designed to ensure "equitable exploitation" of seabed for benefit of all countries, "especially the developing
countries"). CompareDeep Seabed Mining: Hearingson H.R. 3350, H.R. 4582, H.R.
3652, H.R. 4922, H.R. 5624, H.R. 6846, and H.R. 6784 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 189-90 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Deep Seabed Mining] (Joel Pritchard)
(arguing "best interest of mankind" to exploit seabed minerals) with id. at 190
(John Quigley) (asking in response which part of mankind will be helped) and
Biggs, Deepsea's Adventures: GrotiusRevisited, 9 INT'L LAw. 271, 277 (1975) (contending that arguments for seabed mining are unconvincing to LDCs that depend
on export of terrestrial production to feed their population). See generally
Thompson, Moral Values and InternationalPolitics,88 PoLrrcAL Sci. Q. 368, 370
(1973) (national claims of morality often larger than actions warrant ).
19. Principles should be "universal" in the sense that they apply to all cases of
a certain sort, such as all cases concerning the distribution of global wealth. Second, they must be "general" in the sense that they make no reference to individual people or entities and are not "rigged" so as to describe a unique situation in
general terms. R. BnANrT, ETmcAL THEORY 19-20 (1959); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 131-33 (1971).
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nomic Order.20 The debate is centered on the exploitation of
manganese nodules, which contain about twenty-seven minerals,2 1 the most valuable being nickel (1.5%), copper (1.3%), and
cobalt (.25%).22 The nodules under scrutiny are those located
within what the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT)23
calls "the Area," 24 which is "the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."25 National
sovereignty in the ocean floor is limited to the continental shelf,26
which extends either 200 miles from the relevant baselines or to
the end of the continental margin, whichever is farther seaward. 27
Because those nodules in the Area lie beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, entitlements to them are not readily apparent.
Despite this uncertainty of legal title, the various mining consortia have developed plans and technology for nodule exploitation.
The execution of these plans has been challenged by LDCs
which, though lacking the technology to exploit the nodules, claim
28
entitlements to them.
The Economics of the Seabed Nodule Debate
The narrow economic conflict in Committee I arises because
seabed mining will reduce mining revenues of current terrestrial
producers. The demand for cobalt and manganese is rather inelastic because they are necessary for their current uses yet have
no attractive alternative uses or any reasonably priced substi20. See text accompanying notes 40-55 infra.
21. OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 3, at 5.
22. Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at 86. Percentages are those found in
economically viable deposits. Although the nodules on average contain 25% manganese, the combination of demand limitations and processing difficulties thus far
have restricted all ventures save one to a three-metal process. Id. at 97. The economic viability of ocean mining is primarily based on nickel. Id. at 192-93 (statement of B. Gill Clements); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 at 31-32, 50 (1974), reprintedin
UNITED NATIONS SOURCE DOCUMmETs ON SEABED MINING 34, 62-63, 81 (Ocean Science News ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as U.N. SEABED MINING]. The exploitable
minerals contained in the nodules are used primarily in industry.
23. Supra note 4.
24. Committee rs Part X of the ICNT applies to the "Area," ICNT, supra note
4, art. 134, although it may also have applicability to other zones.
25. Id. art. 1.
26. See id. arts. 76, 86, 89, 137.
27. Id. art. 76. Agreement on the outer limit of the continental margin was
reached at the Ninth Session. See Spring 1980 Delegation Report, supranote 4, at
31.
28. See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra.

tutes. 2 9 In the absence of seabed mining, the supply of these minerals is limited to the content of terrestrial reserves, which
apparently contain amounts sufficient to meet world demand for
decades.3 0 However, because many of these deposits are under
the control of governments that are unstable or economically unfriendly toward the developed countries that use the minerals, an
artificial limit on supply could be imposed.3 1 In contrast, if the
supply of cobalt and manganese includes the readily exploitable 32
29. Manganese serves a crucial function in steel production and has no reasonably priced substitutes. An Econometric Model of the Manganese Ore Industry, U.N. Doc. TD/B/483/Add.1 (1974), at T 7, reprinted in U.N. SEABED MINING,
supra note 22, at 155, 157 [hereinafter cited as Manganese Ore] (also finding price
elasticity of demand for manganese either insignificant or inelastic). Cobalt also
has a low price elasticity in the recent range of prices, although there is speculation that at much lower prices, cobalt would become a viable substitute for other
materials and elasticity would increase. Adams, The Impact of Cobalt Production
from the Sea-Bed, U.N. Doe. TD/B(XIH)/Misc.3 (July 1973) at 1 7-49, reprinted in
U.N. SEABED MINING, supra note 22, at 186, 189-212.
30. OFFICE OF OCEAN, RESOURCE AND SCIENTIFIC POLCY COORDINATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COBALT, COPPER, NICKEL AND MANGANESE:

FUTURE SUPPLY

AND DEMAND AND IMPUCATIONS FOR DEEP SEABED MINING 26 (1979) [hereinafter

cited as DEP'T OF COMMERCE]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COBALT-1977, at 14-15
(Mineral Commodity Profile 5, 1977); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANGANESE1977, at 1, 15-17 (Mineral Commodity Profile MCP-7, 1977).
31. E.g., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 30, at 41-45 (potential supply disruptions, caused by political and socio-economic factors, exist in copper, cobalt, and
manganese markets); N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1979, § A at 11, col. 1 (potential of Russian attempt to control Zairian cobalt and copper should Mobutu lose control).
For data on production by country, see U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COBALT-1977
(Mineral Commodity Profile MCP-5, 1977); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANGANEsE-1977 (Mineral Commodity Profile MCP-7, 1977); DEP'T OF COmIERCE, supra
at 17-39; OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 3, at 45.
There is conflicting testimony as to the likelihood of cartelization in these commodity markets. Industrial leaders who desire congressional support for seabed
mining tend to stress the spectre of cartelization and its effect on the United
States import-dependent steel industry. See, e.g., Deep Seabed Mining,supra note
18, at 132-33 (statement of Jack Carlson); id. at 207-08 (James G. Wenzel).
Academia appears to be divided on this issue. See, e.g., id. at 416-17 (Robert A.
KYImarx) (spectre of producer-consumer agreements); id. at 555-61 (Robert S.
Pindyck) (price increases or supply interruptions unlikely). For a favorite alleged
indicator of the LDCs' intent to cartelize, see Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, 52, U.N. Doc. A/
9631, art. 5 (1974) reprintedin 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251, 255 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Charter] (asserting right of all states to associate in organizations of
primary commodity producers to further their national goals). The Department of
Commerce study finds cartelization is unlikely to be successful. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 30, at 39-40.

32. Extensive deposits of seabed nodules are readily exploitable in two
senses. First, there is no remaining major technological impediment to nodule
mining. E.g., Law of the Sea, supra note 6, at 146, 154 (Marne A. Dubs). Second,
all indications are that seabed mining will be profitable. See U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/25 at 7, 70-78 (1974), reprinted in U.N. SEABED MINING, supra note 22, at
40, 101-09; H.R. REP. No. 96-411 (PART 2), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1979) (internal
rate of return 18%, resulting in 5.4 year payback period); Hauser, An International
FiscalRegime for Deep Seabed Mining: Comparisonsto Land-Based Mining, 19
HARv. INT'L L.J. 759, 787-88 &nn. 191-97 (1978). But see Deep Seabed Mining, supra
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nodules lying on the ocean floor, the supply would be virtually unlimited.33
The supply and demand data indicate that existing land-based
producers, many of which are LDCs, stand to lose significant revenues should seabed mining become a reality. The price these terrestrial producers now charge and receive for their minerals
consists in part of a monopoly rent in excess of the revenue they
would receive in more competitive circumstances.3 4 Because the
seabed miners will have significant cost and strategic advantages
over terrestrial producers, 35 seabed mining will increase competition. Moreover, seabed mining will retain these advantages even
if new high grade terrestrial deposits are discovered. 3 6 The continued profitability of seabed mining is thus ensured. This increased competition will eliminate the monopoly rents currently
enjoyed by terrestrial producers. Further, the new supply will
note 18, at 68-69 (post-testimony submission of Marne A. Dubs) (industry spokesman arguably citing conservative figures because submission made while asking
House committee for indirect subsidy in the form of insurance against an adverse
treaty). Primarily because the consortia have not obtained financing for large
scale commercial operations, development is still in the prototype state. E.g., id.
at 205-10 (James G. Wenzel). The purported reason for this failure to obtain
financing is the threat that the treaty that will emerge from UNCLOS may strip
the consortia of exclusive rights to their seabed minesites. E.g., id. at 53-58
(Marne A. Dubs); id. at 169-78 (C. Thomas Houseman). The consortia apparently
have been unable to obtain insurance against this risk of an unfavorable UNCLOS
outcome. E.g., id. at 199-200 (B. Gill Clements); id. at 370-96 (James W. Dawson).
In its Informal Working Paper IA/1 of April 2, 1980, the Administration noted these
considerations and presented them to UNCLOS. Informal working paper by the
United States, An approach to interim protection of investment, IA/i, 2 April 1980,
reprintedin Spring 1980 Delegation Report, supra note 4.
33. Nigrelli, OceanMineral Revenue Sharing,5 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L 153, 166

(1978).
34. H.R. REP. No. 96-411 (PART 2), supra note 32, at 35; Deep Seabed Mining,
supra note 18, at 45-46 (statement of James L. Oberstar). For economic analyses
discussing these monopoly rents, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 at 58, reprinted in
15U.N. SEABED MUING, supra note 22, at 89 (cobalt); Adams, supra note 29, at
16, reprinted in U.N. SEABED MINING, supra note 22, at 194 (cobalt); Manganese
Ore, supra note 29, at 19, reprintedin U.N. SEABED MiNING, supra note 22, at 162
(manganese).
35. The developed countries that consume these minerals would prefer to deal
with stable, friendly suppliers than with the less stable and less trustworthy LDC
producers. Moreover, because its nationals may participate in the consortia, the
typical developed nation would enjoy other real economic advantages such as an
improvement in its balance of payments, the creation of new jobs, and various
spinoff benefits. Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at 122 (William Fisher); id.
at 208-12 (James G. Wenzel); Law of the Sea, supra note 6, at 159-60 (Marne A.
Dubs).
36. Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at 218 (James G. Wenzel).

cause an erosion of the LDCs' non-monopolistic revenues. For
those terrestrial producers able to remain in business the increased supply coupled with inelastic demand will trigger a large
price decrease.3 7 Other high cost land-based output will be displaced by less costly ocean floor production. 38 Accordingly, it is
not surprising that the LDC terrestrial producers have fastened
on a legal argument to delay or bar the exploitation of seabed
39
nodules.
The IdeologicalElement in the Seabed Nodule Debate
Although initially the Group of 77's 40 position at UNCLOS m
was significantly dictated by the economically threatened terrestrial producers, 41 the current argument is more of an ideological
37. In the case of the more elastic demand for nickel, the price drop will be
less drastic; the new supply will be gobbled up by ravenous consumers at a price
just slightly below the old competitive price.
38. This general theoretical scenario is borne out by the available econometric
studies. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 at 39-43, reprintedin U.N. SEABED MINING, supra
note 22, at 70-74 (cobalt); Adams, supra note 29 (cobalt); Manganese Ore, supra
note 29 (manganese); UNCTAD, The effects of production of manganese from the
sea-bed, with particular reference to effects on developing country producers of
manganese ore, U.N. Doc. TD/B/483 at 1 33 (1974), reprinted in U.N. SEABED MINING, supra note 22, at 147-48 (manganese); UNCTAD, The effects of possible exploitation of the sea-bed on the earnings of developing countries from copper
exports, U.N. Doc. TD/B/484 (1974), reprintedin U.N. SEABED MINING, supra note

22, at 174 (copper). Seabed nickel production should not seriously affect the few
terrestrial producers. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 at 34, reprinted in U.N. SEABED
MINING, supra note 22, at 65; OcEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 3, at 48-49.
Although various assumptions built into these models, such as the timing of nodule exploitation, are obsolete, the scenarios they predict are still valid. Because
manganese would be processed as a by-product, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25 at 33, reprinted in U.N. SEABED MINING, supra note 22, at 64, the manganese model is quite
tenuous. The manganese model also appears to assume the displacement of terrestrial production by seabed production rather than showing this as a result. For
a general discussion of the economic impact of nodule mining, see OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 3, at 41-56. For a description of the havoc caused by
revenue losses in an LDC terrestrial producer, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1979, § A,
at 2, col. 3 (shrinking of copper revenues contributes to Zaire's bankruptcy).
39. See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra. Both developed and developing
terrestrial producers also have sought to limit any seabed mining via production
ceilings that tie seabed production to the growth of demand for nickel. See, e.g.,
Breaux, The Diminishing Prospectsfor an Acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty, 19
VA. J. INT'L L. 257, 266-69 (1979). They appear to have succeeded: a general consensus on a ceiling on nodule production was reached at the Ninth Session. While
the proposed revisions of ICNT Rev. 1, supranote 4, art. 151, also include a production floor, it is unclear from the Delegation Report whether the consortia can proceed under the suggested ceiling. See Spring 1980 Delegation Report, supra note
4, at 17-19.
40. The Group of 77 is the organized caucusing group of LDCs in the U.N. system that attempts to coordinate member positions on issues of general interest to
LDCs. Friedheim & Durch, The InternationalSeabed Resources Agency negotiations and the New InternationalEconomic Order, 31 INT'L ORGANIZAMON 343, 344
n.2 (1977).
41. Morris, The New InternationalEconomic Order and the New Law of the
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debate over the appropriate structure of the world economy. The
Group of 77, a sympathizer of which drafted Part XI of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT),42 would like the regime
that will govern the exploitation of seabed nodules to conform to
the norms of the New World Economic Order.43 For example, the
New Order demand that "all States should avoid prejudicing the
interests of developing countries" 44 so profoundly affected the
ICNT that the United States contemplated withdrawing from UNCLOS.45 As the New Order ideology took effect, developing nations asserted control over their own natural resources by
expelling and expropriating assets from capitalist entities.4 6 The
Group of 77 has introduced this spirit into the seabed nodule debate by insisting that the "Area," as the "common heritage of
mankind," 47 cannot be exploited at will by the developed nations.
Further, although the world traditionally has been dominated by
Sea, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH? 175, 177-79 (1977); Friedheim & Durch, supra

3
note 40, at 74; Nelson, The Emerging New Law of the Sea, 42 MOD. L REV. 42, 49
(1979). There were indications at the 1979 and 1980 sessions that terrestrial producers still exercise considerable control over provisions affecting their economies.
See the discussion of production ceilings at note 39 supra; Status Report Spring
1979, supra note 4, at 17-18; U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Law of the Sea Negotiations, U.S. Delegation Report, Resumed Eighth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York, Jul. 16 - Aug. 24, 1979, at 14-16
(copy on file at the San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Summer 1979
Delegation Report].
42. ICNT, supra note 4.
43. The New Order crystallized in the Spring of 1974 at the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Approved without vote at that session were
two seminal documents, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3201(S-VI) (1974), reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 715 (1974),
and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA. Res. 3202(S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/3202(S-VI) (1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 720 (1974). A subsequent document expounding New Order tenets is the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, adopted at the 29th session of the General Assembly
by a vote of 120-6 (with 10 abstentions). Charter, supra note 31.
44. Charter, supra note 31, art. 24. The Charter urges that the LDCs should
receive preferences with regard to, inter alia, general economic progress (art. 11),
access to the scientific and technological achievements of others (art. 13), welfare
and living standards (art. 14), tariffs (art. 18), and financial inflows (art. 22).
45. Oceanography Miscellaneous, supra note 4, at 40-42 (Elliot Richardson)
(maintaining that ICNT was "fundamentally unacceptable" and urging President
of United States to review utility of continued negotiations).
46. For an official expression of this ideology, see Charter, supra note 31, arts.
2, 5 (a State has the right to cartelize and to "nationalize, expropriate or transfer
ownership of foreign property").
47. ICNT, supra note 4, art. 136.

a consensus of the strong, the New Order's advocacy of one-nation, one-vote threatens to topple the older order by giving power
to the weak but numerous. 48 The Group of 77 has demanded that
the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA), an entity to be established to organize and control activities in the Area, 49 be governed
by "the sovereign equality of all its members." 50 Indeed, the composition of the ISA's executive organ, the Council, seems to deny
the developed countries even so much as a veto power. 51 Perhaps
most troubling to the developed nations is that the New Order insistence on socialist, centrally-controlled systems of economic development now dominates the ICNT regime for exploiting seabed
nodules. The ISA's operating arm, the Enterprise, is to oversee
access to the Area 52 and is mandated to permit exploitation by
53
"joint arrangements" only.

As the ideological struggle at UNCLOS continues, it becomes
more apparent that what emerges from Committee I will be instrumental in the success or failure of the broader campaign for a
New World Economic Order.54 Because this legal precedent will
carry considerable weight in resolving future conflicts over the
distribution of global wealth, 55 it should be based on a principle
sufficiently general to be useful in the peaceful adjudication of
these future disputes. After examining the current law of the seabed and finding no compelling legal precedent, this Article will
48. R. TUcKER, supra note 11, at 48; see Charter, supra note 31, art. 10.
49. ICNT, supra note 4, arts. 154-86.
50. Id. arts. 155, 157(5).
51. Id. arts. 159-64; ICNT Rev. 1, supra note 4, arts. 161-65. The Council will
consist of 36 members, each member having one vote. Decisions on matters of
substance shall be taken by a three-fourths majority. The composition of the
Council, dictated by ICNT art. 159(1) (ICNT Rev. 1 art. 161(1)), does not seem to
assure developed nations the ten sympathetic voices required for a veto. This remains a most controversial point and may preclude treaty signature or ratification.
See Spring 1980 Delegation Report, supra note 4, at 26-27. For a discussion of the
manifestation of the one nation, one vote concept in the ICNT, see Breaux, supra
note 39, at 278-81.
52. ICNT, supranote 4, art. 169 &Annex I.
53. Id. Annex 11(5) (i). The general trend at the 1979 sessions was toward a
more certain socialist regime that denies unreasonable flexibility to the administrators of the Enterprise. The earlier version permitted the administrators to alter
the terms of contracts between the Enterprise and consortia even after the consortia had sunk capital into a particular minesite. The developed countries managed
to excise clauses such as "[n]othing in this paragraph shall in any way limit the
discretion of the Enterprise." ICNT Rev. 1, supra note 4, Annex Il, art. 3 (revising
ICNT, supra note 4, Annex H(3)).
54. See, e.g., Law of the Sea, supra note 6, at 29.
55. See, e.g., Breaux, supra note 39, at 261-65; Darman, The Law of the Sea: Re.
thinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOREIGN A'F. 373, 387-88 (1978); Friedheim & Durch,
supra note 40, at 344. But see Charney, The United States Interests in a Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Casefor ContinuedEfforts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 39, 42 (1978) (arguing that any concessions made at UNCLOS can be distinguished easily at other negotiations).
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suggest one based on a notion of impartial justice that could be

useful in resolving the seabed dispute and serve as a precedent in
future conflicts.
SEABED NODULES AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Seeking to retain existing terrestrial mining profits and to reap
the benefits of emerging New Order norms, the LDCs have attempted to thwart unilateral exploitation of seabed nodules by invoking a legal argument that denies the consortia free access to
the nodules. The developed countries disagree, arguing that unilateral exploitation is permissible under current public international law. Neither the LDCs' nor the developed countries' legal
arguments are persuasive: there are no clear prior entitlements
to seabed nodules.
The arguments on both sides of the nodule debate appear to be
disingenuous, self-serving claims. The Group of 77 argues that
the nodules are the "common heritage of mankind," as defined by
the Declaration of Principles, also referred to as the Common
Heritage Resolution, passed unanimously in 1970 by the United
Nations General Assembly.5 6 This Resolution maintains, inter
alia, that no person or State may appropriate or exercise sovereignty over any part of the seabed,5 7 and that all exploitation of
the seabed "shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a
whole . . .taking into particular consideration the interests and
needs of the developing countries."5 8 The Resolution further stipulates that all activities in the seabed area are to be carried out
under the auspices of the ISA and that all entities are bound to
refrain from exploitation until an international regime is estab59
lished.
If this legal argument 6Owere valid, the nodules could not be ex56. G.4- Res. 2749 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970), reprintedin 1 S. ODA, supra note 1, at 44, and reprinted in 10 Nr'L LEGAL
MATEmALS 220 (1971). Paragraph 1 contains the common heritage declaration.
57. Id. 12.
58. Id. 7.
3-4 see the Moratorium Resolution, GA. Res. 2574D (XXIV), 24 U.N.
59. Id.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 10, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969), reprinted in 1 S. ODA, supra
note 1, at 43 (explicit moratorium on seabed exploitation).
60. Similar arguments have been made with regard to outer space and Antarctica. Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at 181-82 (John Quigley). For a comprehensive analysis of Antarctica as a "common space," see Honnold, Thaw in
International Law? Rights in Antarctica under the Law of Common Spaces, 87
YALE L.J. 804 (1978).

ploited unilaterally by the consortia and the LDCs would prevail.
The argument fails, however, because these U.N. resolutions are
not binding law but only recommendatory. 61 Moreover, many
commentators, including the U.S. Department of State, believe
that the Group of 77 has misinterpreted the term "common heritage" as used in the Common Heritage Resolution. They argue
that "common heritage" does not require the ownership of nodules by a world authority for the benefit of all nations, but only
that the seabed, or at least the nodules, is "commonly" available
to all.62 These commentators argue that the nodules are not
owned by the community of states as a res communis,6 3 but are
unowned things, res nullius,64 capable of being reduced to owner61. See Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at 426 (H. Gary Knight) (stating
that conditions behind unanimous approval of Common Heritage Resolution indicate unilateral seabed exploitation still legal); id. at 443 (H. Gary Knight) (vote on
resolution merely indicates expectation); N. ELY, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE
TO DEEPSEA MmmG 52-62 (1974) (opinion of The Law Offices of Northcutt Ely sub-

mitted to Deepsea Ventures, Inc.) (General Assembly resolutions merely are invitations or recommendations to enter treaties); Pietrowski, Hard Minerals on the
Deep Ocean Floor: Implications ForAmerican Law and Policy, 19 Wi. &MARY L
REv. 43, 67-69 (1977) (United States view rejects contention that resolutions are
binding and prohibit unilateral seabed exploitation). But see Deep Seabed Mining,
supra note 18, at 181-84 (John Quigley) (unanimous adoption of Common Heritage
Resolution enables it to legally bind all voters). See generally Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Company (International Companies v. Libya) (1977), reprinted in 17
INT'L LEGAL MATAIS 1, 28-31 (indicating that the precedential value of General

Assembly resolutions depends, interalia, on voting conditions).
62. E.g., U.S. Department of State, Statement on Claim of Exclusive Mining
Rights by Deepsea Ventures, Inc., 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 66 (1975); Deep Sea.

bed Mining, supra note 18, at 449-50 (Elliot Richardson); N. ELY, supra note 61, at
62 (quoting John Norton Moore, Chairman, National Security Council's Interagency Task Force on Law of the Sea).
63. A res communis "is a thing belonging to everybody." If title is vested in
the community of States, the seabed qua res communis could theoretically be
carved up after proper authorization. C. CoLOMBos, THE INTERNATONAL LAw OF
THE SEA 66 (6th ed. 1967). Until such authorization is given by the international
community, however, there can be no unilateral exploitation of the nodules. L.
HEu=n , LAW FOR THE SEA'S MIERAL RESOURCES 29 (ISHA Monograph No. 1,

1968). The Group of 77 advocates a variant of res communis by arguing that there
can be no legal exploitation of the seabed nodules until UNCLOS produces a
treaty with a definitive regulatory regime, an argument also in keeping with the
New Order philosophy. See the Moratorium Resolution, supra note 59. The concept of the seabed as a res communis has not been popular among the theorists,
however. See, e.g., N. ELY, supra note 61, at 17-22; L. HENKIN, supra, at 25; Burton,
Freedom of the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep Seabed Mining
Claims, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1159-61, 1167-68 (1977). But see C. CoLO~mos, supra,

at 65-69 (seabed is common and open to all nations).
64. For definitions of res nullius, see C. CoLoznos, supra note 63, at 66; Deep
Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at 425 (H. Gary Knight). Historically, res nullius
has been the favored conception of the seabed. L.HErm, supra note 63, at 25.
The application of this concept to seabed nodules would favor the developed nations that have the technology necessary to exploit the nodules. E.g., R. DurUY,
THE LAw OF THE SEA 128 (1974). This laissez-faire attitude is an anathema to the
New Order philosophy, however, because it exacerbates existing economic disparities. See R. TUCKER, supra note 11, at 68-72. Thus, it is not surprising that the
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ship on a first come, first serve basis. These res nullius arguments also fail, however, because they are based on dubious
5
customary law precedents concerning the continental shelf.6
Alternatively, it has been argued that the nodules are neither
res communis nor res nullius,66 but that their exploitation is restricted only by the usual duty to behave on the high seas with
reasonable regard to the similar rights of others. 67 Because the
high seas, which include the seabed, are not subject to unilateral
claim by any sovereign,68 this argument must draw the astonishing distinction between laying a claim to the seabed and merely
exploiting the nodules as a high seas freedom.69 Once it is perconsortia advocate the application of res nullius to the seabed. E.g., N. ELY, supra
note 61, at 11-22; see Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at 425 (H. Gary Knight)
(arguing the nodules themselves are res nullius); L. HEm, supra note 63, at 2530 (relating arguments for the seabed as res nullius). The sole restriction recognized by these arguments is that those who exploit seabed nodules must respect
others' high seas freedoms. See, e.g., Deep Seabed Mining, supra at 449 (Elliot
Richardson).
65. Before 1945, when the continental shelf was still beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, various states tended coral, pearl, sponge, chank, and oyster
beds on the shelf. These states, it is argued, had a right to exploit those resources
lying beyond national jurisdiction. N. ELY, supranote 61, at 15-21. Those beds, the
argument continues, accordingly must have been res nullius. Because the nodules
also lie beyond national jurisdiction, it is concluded that they too must be res nullius, and thus are exploitable by the first comer. This argument assumes that the
res nullius status of those resources was the factor legitimating their exploitation.
This assumption is questionable, however, because it ispossible to find other
sources of legitimation, such as usage from time immemorial, that are inapplicable
to seabed nodules. C. CoLoaBos, supra note 63, at 67-68; see Burton, supra note
63, at 1154-56 (precedents based not on res nullius but on historic usage and contiguity of sedentary species to coastal state). In addition to questioning the validity
of the precedents, various writers also argue that today those precedents are easily distinguishable. E.g., L.HENKiN, supra note 63, at 29 (factual distinction between pearl fishing and mid-ocean nodule mining); Biggs, Deepsea'sAdventures:
Grotius Revisited-A Rejoinder, 10 INT'L LAW. 309, 313-14 (1976) (mining technology unknown when alleged precedents set).
66. Burton, supra note 63, at 1161-69.
67. Id. at 1169-80.
68. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, art. 2, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.L.AS. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (high seas not subject to claims of sovereignty).
69. See, e.g., H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1979); I.R. REP. No. 96-411
(PART 2), supra note 32, at 42 (unilateral mining bill allows issuance of permits for
commercial recovery of nodules but asserts no U.S. sovereignty over or ownership
of seabed nodules); Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, 188-89 (John B. Breaux)
(apparently arguing that because seabed miners make no actual "declaration of
ownership against the world," they violate international law only in a "de facto"
way, but not "from a legal standpoint"); N. ELY, supra note 61, at 6-7 ('The right
sought is an exclusive right to take, use, and sell a deposit of manganese nodules
* . .[but] does not constitute the acquisition of permanent title, comparable to fee

ceived that mining the nodules appropriates virtually all of the
seabed's known enjoyment value, this distinction is reduced to a
cosmetic "legal contrivance";7 0 the high seas argument becomes
equivalent to the doubtful res nulliu argument because claiming
a thing's full enjoyment value is the defacto equivalent of claim7
ing the thing itself. 1
Adherents to either the res nullius or the high seas arguments
contend that nodule exploitation is governed by the regime of the

high seas and point for support to Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas.7 2 Article 2 does list several items
that comprise the freedom of the high seas, but the freedom to exploit the seabed is not mentioned. The developed countries argue
that because the list was not intended to be comprehensive, it
should embrace seabed nodule mining.73 This textual argument
is unpersuasive, however, because the International Law Commission's commentaries appear to remove seabed mining from
the regime of the high seas. 7 4 Further, the argument fails to rebut
simple, in the seabed itself'); Burton, supra note 63, at 1178 n.179 (miners hold no
right to area or its resources, but simply remove nodules for private use).
70. Darman, supra note 55, at 383; cf.Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at
184 (John Quigley) (noting that under unilateral mining legislation, U.S. would be
the lessor of sites it claimed not to own).
71. Biggs sarcastically remarks that "[p] erhaps there is a sophisticated procedure by which seabed resources may be taken, used, transported, processed and
sold without establishing exclusive rights over the same." Biggs, supra note 18, at
281. This remark misses the point. The consortia admit to be claiming the nodules
but deny claiming the seabed from which the nodules are harvested. The spuriousness of this denial is apparent once it is realized that, today, nodule mining
represents virtually the full enjoyment value of that seabed area.
72. Supra note 68.
73. E.g., N. ELY, supra note 61, at 23-28; Burton, supra note 63, at 1172-76
Finlay, United States Policy with Respect to High Seas Fisheriesand Deep Seabed
Minerals-A Study in Contrasts,9 NAT. RESOURCEs LAW. 629, 630-32 (1976). Article
2 reads as follows:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and noncoastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of freedom of the
high seas.
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 68, art. 2. The debate centers on
whether the "inter alia" incorporates seabed nodule mining.
74. In 1955, the International Law Commission (ILC) explicitly stated that seabed mining was a high seas freedom under its conception of the "interalia" of article 2. 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Com'N 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955/Add.1 (1960).
However, the following year the ILC consciously deleted seabed exploitation from
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the LDCs' argument that those LDCs not existing in 1958 should
75
not be bound by a treaty biased in favor of maritime powers;
and that the recent "Third World Revolution" obsolesces both old
customary law and the 1958 treaty even as applied to LDCs existing in 1958.76
its conception of "other freedoms" included in the "inter alia" of article 2. 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1956/Add.1 (1957). The reason
given by the ILC for the change of position was that "such exploitation had not yet
assumed sufficient practical importance to justify special regulation." Id. The
clear implication of these words is that if and when seabed mining assumes practical importance, it will come under special regulation as opposed to the ordinary
regime of the high seas. The explicit and conscious change of position between
the 1955 and 1956 commentaries at the very least indicates that the ILC wanted to
remove seabed mining from the realm of high seas freedoms and to say nothing
about its status in conventional international law. But see Burton, supra note 63,
at 1172-73 (asserting without argument that 1956 110 statement isolates seabed
mining as high seas freedom; failing to discuss explicit alteration of language by
ILC between 1955 and 1956); Murphy, supra note 8, at 536-38 (arguing that 110 altered commentary language because seabed mining not important). Murphy's position fails to discuss the notion of "special regulation." He notes correctly that
seabed mining was demoted from explicit mention in the commentary. His argument necessarily is that while the ILC's 1955 commentary explicitly made seabed
mining a high seas freedom, it deleted seabed mining from its 1956 commentary in
order to leave unaltered the status of seabed mining as a high seas freedom. Presumably the reason for this odd procedure is that between 1955 and 1956, seabed
mining lost practical importance in the opinion of the ILC. On the contrary, it is
more plausible to interpret an explicit alteration of language as being made for the
purpose of changing the previous position rather than leaving it unchanged.. The 1956 indication that seabed exploitation is not a high seas freedom but is a budding candidate for "special regulation" arguably is the rationale behind the alteration of the commentary language. Cf.Law of the Sea, supra note 6, at 419 (letter
from legal experts to Chairman of Group of 77) (asserting without argument that
1958 Convention does not include seabed exploitation as high seas freedom).
While a textual approach appears unconvincing, other arguments that the nodules are governed by high seas principles are conceivable. Indeed if the original
thrust behind the concept of high seas freedoms is the notion that the seas' wealth
cannot be exhausted, C. CoLOMBos, supra note 63, at 62-63, those principles seem
peculiarly applicable to seabed nodules. Cf. Nigrelli, supra note 33, at 166 (nodules could provide millennia of mineral supplies).
75. See Nelson, supra note 41, at 42. Res nullius and high seas arguments
favor developed nations. See text accompanying notes 64-71 supra.
76. See, e.g., Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at 183-85 (John Quigley) (arguing that much of pre-1970 international law now obsolete); Law of the Sea,
supra note 6, at 421 (letter from legal experts to Chairman of Group of 77) (Declaration of Principles obsolesces prior international custom); Biggs, supra note 18, at
277 (criticizing high seas arguments for ignoring 'Third World Revolution"); cf. L.
HENNIN, supra note 63, at 29 (traditional freedoms may bow to new circumstances).
This theme appears in other facets of New World Economic Order philosophy.
See, e.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, supra note 43,
1-2 (proclaiming that recently decolonized countries must
participate equally in deciding all questions of international importance); cf. Guha

In short, the legal arguments on both sides of the Committee I
debate are unconvincing, perhaps because they are designed primarily to produce self-serving results. This legal vacuum has deterred the consortia from exploiting the nodules unilaterally 77 and
thus sufficed, from the LDCs' point of view, to enable them to
achieve their dual goal of maintaining mining profits and providing the New World Economic Order with a better chance of acceptance. But time is running out. In all likelihood, the 96th
Congress will pass legislation establishing an interim regime to
promote the development of hard mineral resources in the deep
seabed.78 This eventually could lead to great controversy 79 because the mine sites that would be established under U.S. law
would be independent of the ISA and justified by no compelling
legal argument.
A PRINCIPLED SOLUTION TO THE SEABED NODULE DEBATE

Committee I has an opportunity to fill this legal vacuum and to
avert dangerous unilateral actions by constructing a principled legal regime to govern nodules and, by analogy, global wealth. This

section will first discuss reasons for recommending that western
delegates approach the nodule debate from a moral and principled position. Then it will suggest to the delegates methods for
designing a morally principled regime. Applying this regime to
manganese nodules would dictate their probable exploitation by
the consortia and the transfer of excess profits to impoverished

countries, but not necessarily to the economically injured terrestrial producers.
Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of Statesfor Injuries to Aliens A Partof Universal InternationalLaw?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863, 888 (1961) (arguing that "new world
community" has brought about "radical change" that makes "traditional basis of
obligation outmoded").
77. See note 32 supra.
78. H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 493, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
(passed by the Senate Dec. 14, 1979).
79. See note 7 supra. Congress's apparent accession to the Administration's
request to postpone unilateral mining until 1988, see note 8 supra, should defuse
this situation temporarily. However, once the unilateral mining bill becomes law,
either failure at UNCLOS or the Senate's refusal to ratify the treaty would reignite
the controversy and perhaps fan the flames to new heights. Indeed it is not implausible that the consortia agreed to the 1988 compromise, see note 8 supra,
solely in order to get the bill enacted into law, fully expecting to lobby for and successfully obtain the treaty's defeat in the Senate. After the treaty's defeat, the
consortia, under the United States protection, arguably could exploit the nodules
and retain the bulk of the profit. See text accompanying note 86 infra (profit sharing provisions of unilateral mining legislation).
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The West Should Maintaina Principledand Impartial Position
in the Committee I Debate
Because the West currently possesses economic and military
superiority over the Third World,80 the resolution of the nodule
debate most likely will reflect western interests. Currently the
consortia, prompted by the likelihood that it will be some years
before a treaty acceptable to the United States could enter into
force, 8 1 have slowed outlays for nodule mining projects and have
begun to invest their capital elsewhere. 82 Congress has reacted
by introducing unilateral mining legislation, 83 primarily because it
is concerned that this disinvestment will cause the loss of nodule
mining technology. 84 The State Department, mindful of the vital
role played by seabed minerals in our economic well-being and
national defense, supports the early enactment of this legislation.85 Under this unilateral regime the West would appropriate
all but .75% of the nodules' value 86 and gain the consequent economic advantages, including a reliable supply of minerals and balance of payments savings. Because the formal negotiations have
been unable to reach this power-based resolution, it might be
reached unilaterally. 87 Although the LDCs would condemn this
action in the United Nations and invoke retaliatory measures,
these sanctions are unlikely to damage western economic interests significantly because the West still retains economic and military superiority over the LDCs and their committed allies.88
80. E.g., Smith, Changing configurations of power in North-South Relations

since 1945, 31 Iwr'L

ORGANIZAION

1, 7-18 (1977).

81. While significant progress was made at the resumed eighth and initial
ninth sessions of UNCLOS, see notes 8, 9, 27, & 39 supra,serious problems remain.
See Spring 1980 Delegation Report, supra note 4, at 14 (technology transfer), 23
(Enterprise financing), 26-27 (Council voting), & 41-42 (final clauses). Further,
many States probably will not ratify the treaty, id. at 22, and in any event a
lengthy interim period between signature and entry into force is expected. Foreign Affairs Testimony, supra note 8, at 6. Indeed the Administration is concerned

that the current draft's 70 State threshhold for entry into force is "unusually high."
Spring 1980 Delegation Report, supra note 4, at 41.
82. Law of the Sea, supra note 6, at 147-48 (Marne A. Dubs).
83. See note 5 supra.
84. See note 8 supra.

85. Id.
86. ILR. REP. No. 96-411

(PART

3), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) (discussing

H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402-03 (1979).
87. See note 79 supra.
88. Law of the Sea, supra note 6, at 186 (Elliot Richardson) (LDCs' threats

perhaps significantly discountable); id. at 230-31 (consortia executives) (retaliatory expropriations not a major concern).

This balance of power, however, appears to be moving toward
equalization. Because of increasing global economic interdependence and the proliferation of destructive weaponry, there is an
emerging disjunction between military might and the ability to
coerce and to maintain order.89 Despite its apparent military superiority, the West's growing dependence on other regions for raw
materials is neutralizing its military power. This increases the
chance of violent disruptions of world order because no "policeman" is powerful enough to risk authoritative intervention.90 The
slowing of economic growth is another factor increasing the likelihood of a violent disruption between the rich and the poor 0 ' because growth lessens the potential of violence by permitting the
mitigation of inequities without taking wealth from those currently possessing it.92
In this environment of slowed growth and entities more equal
in bargaining power, negotiated solutions will be more difficult to
achieve if each party bargains solely from self-interest. Accordingly, another way of resolving disputes over global wealth will be
required. An obvious candidate would be a forum, such as a court
of law, that would impartially derive and apply general principles 93 of justice to resolve disputes among self-interested entities.
However, currently there is no world court able to settle disputes
over global wealth and to enforce its decisions. Indeed the only
entities that can do so are the western nations that currently have
substantial but shrinking economic and military power. Thus,
unilateral action by those western powers is required; not in the
form of appropriating seabed wealth, but by voluntarily approaching the dispute from an impartial and principled perspective. 94
89. R. TUCKER, supra note 11, at 80-95.
90. The November, 1979, situation at the U.S. embassy in Teheran is a recent
example.
91. See R. HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT (1974) (wars of
redistribution feared should population growth outpace economic growth); Cf. B.
BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 132 n.4 (1973) (foresees potential "catastrophic conflict" emanating from poverty of LDCs); J. TINBERGEN, RESHAPING
THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 210 (1976) (slowing of global growth rates will create
pressure to redistribute wealth); Lewis, Oi Other Scarcities,and the Poor Coun.
tries,27 WoRu PoL. 63, 82-86 (1974) (inroads into global inequalities necessary for
maintenance of reasonable world order).
92. Cf. Lekachman, Oh, That Golden Era (Of an Orderly World), New York
Times, Aug. 26, 1979, § 4, at 23, col. 1 (clue to understanding world's disorder is
shift from comparatively benign politics of growth to nasty, complicated dilemmas
of distribution). But cf.Nagel, Inequality and Discontent: A Nonlinear Hypothesis, 26 WORLD POL. 453 (1974) (increasing inequalities from moderate to extreme
levels may lessen potential of violence).
93. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
94. Proponents of unilateral appropriation often try to couch their national
self-interest in impartial terms. See note 18 supra. For example, Congressman
Murphy, supra note 8, at 553, writes that seabed mining will result in lower min-
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Western powers must take this unilateral action immediately
because the growing importance of two trends will make it more
difficult for the LDCs to perceive that the West is approaching negotiations over global wealth from a moral and principled position. First, in the slow growth environment of zero sum transfers,
any argument made by a particular entity that results in that entity retaining or gaining wealth is likely to be viewed as a purely
self-interested position. In a zero sum situation, therefore, the
statement that one's claims have been tempered by principle and
morality is likely to be discounted. A similar discounting will occur if the second condition, relatively equal bargaining power, is
manifested. An entity that does not possess the ability to dominate will have difficulty claiming that it is acting morally, instead
of out of necessity, when it makes concessions. Accordingly,
should either or both of these conditions exist, any claim to
wealth will most likely be regarded as totally self-interested.
Such a claim is likely to trigger an equally self-interested response from the threatened entity. In contrast, an argument perceived to be morally justified is less likely to inject fear into the
other party and therefore is less likely to provoke as self-interested a response. A more peaceful and moral world would prevail.
This approach to the problem of global distribution of wealth is
mandated by moral as well as practical concerns. Undoubtedly
what emerges from Committee I will be an important precedent
in international law.95 Arguably all law, including international
law, should have a moral basis. A principled and impartial approach to the nodule debate would be moral because impartiality,
the independence from a nation's particular identity of its choice
eral prices for all and that all nations will benefit from an "equitable" unilateral
mining structure. Unfortunately, he fails to provide the details of the theories underlying his assertion. For example, it is unclear how a poor terrestrial producer
such as Zaire will benefit from lower mineral prices and the displacement of its
production by seabed mining. Further, given that wealthy nations thus far have
been unable to let even a "scarcely significant" amount of aid (1% of GNP as recommended by the Pearson Commission) trickle down to poor nations, Mr. Murphy must have in mind a unique mechanism that will facilitate the transition he
foresees "of all-not just some-nations ... into a world of truly abundant
wealth." Id.; cf. A. ATmUSON, THE EcoNOMIcs OF INEQUALrrY 251-56 (1975) (citing
Pearson Commission's recommendation that rich nations should provide annual
aid of 1% of GNP to poor; demonstrating that this target, while higher than current
levels of aid, would have a "scarcely significant effect" on world income distribution).
95. See note 55 &upra.

and application of principles, is an important component of a
moral foreign policy. 96 This procedural conception of morality differs from the result-oriented conceptions which provide that a
moral approach is one that requires a redistribution ofwealth
from rich to poor.97 Clearly the result-oriented conception of morality is not impartial because a nation's attitude toward the rule
is likely to depend on whether that nation is rich or poor.
The perception by the Third World that the West is approaching problems of global wealth distribution from an impartial
rather than a purely self-interested point of view arguably will
mitigate the threat of violence 98 and promote more conciliatory
and harmonious relations among world governments. 99 Currently
96. See R. BRA=r, supra note 19, at 249-50, 263-64.
97. For examples of this perspective, see, e.g., B. BARRY, supra note 91, at 13132 (failure of rich nations to devote even one percent of national income to aid
poor "scandalously immoral"); Lewis, supra note 91, at 83 (substantial transnational redistribution of wealth "ethically necessary"). Pope John Paul H maintains that "Christ demands an openness that is more than benign attention, more
than token actions or half-hearted efforts that leave the poor as distitute [sic] as
before... [r]iches and freedom create a special obligation." N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1979, § B, at 3, col. 2.
98. The procedural and result-oriented definitions of morality indicate that absent significant changes of approach to or ownership of global wealth, a war of redistribution would be ethical.
99. Because in the international arena virtually all positions are suspected of
being based solely on self-interest, the usefulness of a principled position will be
lost unless the LDCs perceive this moral component. Convincing articulation of
the position therefore is required. For example, having a negotiator make issuespecific concessions based on unarticulated principles is unlikely to foster the perception of principled morality because most concessions made during negotiations
easily can be interpreted as being involuntary or totally self-interested. In contrast, it is less likely that the same result will be characterized as exclusively selfinterested if it clearly is derived from a well-articulated set of principles because
the generality of the principles prohibits the powerful party from crafting a rule
that furthers its self-interest in any specific, perhaps unforeseen situation. Cf.
Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 940 (1979)
(prison arbitral awards based on l-defined standards lack legitimacy that accompanies decision perceived based on neutral standards); Thompson, supra note 18,
at 372 (perceptions of ourselves, our national interests, and interests and commitments of others are vital in international politics and are determined by interests
and their value context).
Besides stressing the moral component of their position, western negotiators
should take pains to demonstrate that their outlook is not that of a Good Samaritan bestowing charity on the destitute. Their moral and principled approach
should be rooted primarily in the belief that the law governing global wealth
should be just in the sense of being impartial. To characterize this approach as
charity would only ignite the controversial demands for reparations and the dangerous politics of resentment. See note 115 infra.
The preceding argument relies on the rationality of world leaders. While
counter examples may be identified, international relations generally are conducted by rational actors who can perceive and appreciate the difference between
impartial and self-interested solutions. Given the military weaponry currently
available, the contrary assumption of irrational global interactions emanating from
resentment-based demands foreshadows a devastating outcome.
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economic growth continues, power is not equalized, and the West
is capable of influencing greatly the moral tone of international
relations.100 Principled and impartial western negotiating stances
plausibly will not have their roots in self-interest if they are convincingly articulated and especially if they result in concessions
not required by the current balance of power. In a more equal
and economically stagnant world of the near future, the West will
be able to argue convincingly from a principled position only if it
can demonstrate that historically, when it did hold dominating
power, it acted according to the same principles. In short, establishing today a precedent for a principled approach to disputes
over global wealth is important because of the potentially shortlived credibility of the position and the foreseeable need for the
approach in the near future.1O'
100. E.g., President Carter's role in the Egypt-Israel negotiations and, arguably,
his campaign for human rights.
101. Besides better conveying the West's moral commitment, the articulation of
a principled negotiating position will stabilize the poor's expectations of the redistributions they can anticipate. While mandating greater transfers than what might
otherwise occur, general principles also may place an impartial limit on the
amount of redistribution in a particular case. In contrast, a succession of identical
but unprincipled issue-specific concessions may foster excessively high expectations. The West's failure to satisfy these rising expectations for either moral or
self-interested reasons could result in economic or violent disruption. The articulation by the rich of general principles, however, could temper the poor's expectations because those principles might specify precisely how much the poor should
receive, not merely that they should receive a transfer of wealth. Given a clearly
specified moral limit on transfers, frustration and resentment-based disruptions
would be less likely when a request for redistribution is denied. For example, if
the developed nations had articulated a tradition of morally principled responses
to claims to wealth, Dr. Castro's recent demand for a $300 billion redistribution of
wealth, see note 15 supra, may never have been made. The demand, apparently
based on the rising expectations of the LDCs that large concessions from the West
are forthcoming, might not have been made if it exceeded the amount designated
by an articulated principle. In reality, because the rich have not yet articulated a
principled stance, Dr. Castro's demand was made and could not be responded to
in a convincingly principled and nonself-interested way. Indeed the apparent
denial of the request most likely is perceived as being based solely on western
material self-interest. Another example is the Committee I process itself. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 80-87 supra, the slowness of the negotiations does not reflect the realities of relative power. The West's ad hoc
concessions in Committee I have fostered expectations of further concessions
there and in other New Order spheres.
Thus there are practical and moral reasons for using the seabed nodule debate
to construct a principled and impartial western approach to global economic concerns. The following section will suggest two methods for designing such an approach.

Theoretical Considerations
A moral principle must be impartial.102 Western philosophy offers two prominent means for achieving impartiality: the veil of
ignorance and utilitarianism. The veil of ignorance, a concept
most recently advocated by John Rawls,l03 shields a representative group of people from knowledge of their identities. The distribution of wealth agreed upon by these veiled people will be
impartial. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, is a decision rule itself. It guarantees impartiality by mandating an all-powerful
Ideal Observer to arrange things in society impartially so that societal happiness is maximized.
The veil of ignorance can be used to construct an impartial forum in which representatives of the world's inhabitants meet to
establish or alter the rules governing society. Rawls conceives of
them as representing future inhabitants of a yet-to-be established
world. The veil of ignorance operates by permitting them to know
only general facts about human society and behavior, 104 but not
their personal class, status, natural assets, life plan, generation or
even the historical setting of their society.' 05 Rawls argues that
the veil of ignorance, by shielding the representatives from
knowledge of who they will be in society, neutralizes selfish motivations and thus ensures that the distribution of wealth agreed on
will be just.106 Distributive shares are uninfluenced by factors or
traits that Rawls deems to be fortuitous and undeserved, or "arbi1 07
trary from a moral point of view. 1
Rawls maintains that the veiled representatives would choose
"maximin," the maximization of the long-run expectations of the
least advantaged class, as the operational principle for dividing up
societal wealth and privileges. 08 However, it is arguable that
they would not choose maximin.10 9 Further, the veil Rawls uses
to secure impartiality has been criticized for being unnecessarily
"thick" because a more frugal or thin veil, one permitting the representatives to know everything about their society except their
102. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
103. See, e.g., J. RAwLs, supra note 19, at 136-42.
104. They know, for example, that people generally prefer more to less. Id. at
142-43.
105. Id. at 136-42.
106. E.g., id. at 12, 136-37.
107. Id. at 72.
108. E.g., id. at 150-56, 302-03.
109. See, e.g., Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice-I, 23 PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 241
(1973); Harsanyi, Can the Maximin PrincipleServe as a Basisfor Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. PoLrricAL Sm. REV. 594 (1975); Sterba, Distributive Justice, 22 AM. J. Jtrus. 55 (1977).
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own identities, would suffice for impartiality purposes.110 Arguably, these thinly veiled representatives would, instead of choosing
maximin as their decision rule, select a form of utilitarianism, the
maximization of average utility."' Rather than maximizing global
utility, this rule maximizes the arithmetic average of all people's
utility. The two rules are identical only if population is constant.112
A utilitarian decision rule can be justified on its own as well as
by its selection by thinly veiled representatives. Traditional utilitarian theories generally are structured around an Ideal Observer
who arranges things in society in order to maximize societal happiness, however that is defined. This Observer engages in a felicific calculus by surveying every person in order to ascertain how
each person's happiness is affected by various alterations in the
110. Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice-, 23 PHnosopincAL Q. 144, 151-54 (1973).
For a seminal piece on the thin veil of ignorance as a guarantor of impartiality, see
Harsanyi, CardinalUtility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking,
61 J. PoLrncAL ECON. 434 (1953). Rawls responds to the thin veil argument by
maintaining that a thin veil is unworkable because it would make the choice of a
decision rule by the representatives "hopelessly complicated" and require interpersonal utility comparisons. J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 139-40, 172-75; cf. Nagel,
Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS 1, 10 (N. Daniels ed. 1975) (thinly veiled representatives unable to reach decision without a dominant conception of the good).
Rawls' argument fails, however, because workable approximations of interpersonal utility comparisons can be made (and indeed are made every day) if human
beings' preferences are assumed to be governed by similar, basic psychological
laws. Harsanyi, supra note 109, at 600-01; cf. A. SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 78
(1973) (problem of assessing relative needs is very serious but often surmountable). There is no reason, therefore, why the thinly veiled representatives cannot
make such comparisons and agree on an appropriate societal structure. Harsanyi,
supra note 109, at 598-601.
111. See Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, IndividualisticEthics, and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POLInCAL ECON. 309 (1955) (thinly veiled, rationally

self-interested representatives would have cardinal social welfare function equal
to arithmetical mean of utilities of all individuals in society); Harsanyi, supra note
109, at 598 (representatives would opt to maximize that mean); cf. Hare, supra
note 109, at 240-51 (discussing in intuitive terms decision rule that approximates
maximization of average utility). The gist of Rawls' argument against the selection of the principle of average utility by the representatives is that such a selection would be irrational. Rawls contends that the probabilistic reasoning needed
to apply an average utility rule will be engaged in by rational representatives only
if they have sufficient knowledge of the details of their society, something they do
not have behind a thick veil of ignorance. J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 172-75. An
effective rebuttal to Bawls' argument against average utility is that the use of a
"thin veil" of ignorance allows the required objective bases to filter through while
still preserving impartiality. Rawls must accordingly take refuge in his tenuous argument that the decisionmaking process behind the thin veil would be unworkable. See note 110 supra.
112. See J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 160-66.

distribution of societal advantages. Impartiality is guaranteed
quite simply by the mandate to the Observer to be impartial.
In summary, two ways of guaranteeing impartiality are the thin
veil method or traditional utilitarianism. Each method uses a different mechanism for achieving impartiality. The thin veil does
so by tempering the representatives' selfish and rational motivation with ignorance of their ultimate identities. Utilitarianism, in
contrast, achieves impartiality by combining in the Ideal Observer
a rational but benevolent motivation with total knowledge of societal wants and the available means for achieving them.113
The Theory Applied
In order to produce an impartial legal regime of seabed nodules,
Committee I can thus proceed as if it were either a utilitarian
Ideal Observer or a group of veiled representatives.1 14 As veiled
113. Hare, supra note 110, at 150-54.
114. Although both concepts produce impartial results, it is arguable that because reaching decisions behind the veil of ignorance obsolesces discussion of
"reparations," utilitarianism agreed upon by veiled representatives is preferable to
an independently derived utilitarianism, which arguably does require a discussion
of reparations, one fraught with definitional and 'resentment-engendering difflculties. Cf. R. TUCKER, supra note 11, at 121-26 (problems of determining legitimate
bases of claims for reparations); Smith, supra note 80, at 18-27 (legitimacy of demands for reparations unclear).
Unlike the Rawlsian representative, the utilitarian Ideal Observer accepts the
current state of tastes and traits as just, and recommends redistributions according to some teleological, pleasure-maximizing decision rule. The content of these
recommendations thus depends upon tastes acquired under current entitlements.
If the present state of affairs is unjust because it was not impartially determined,
the utilitarian Observer may exacerbate that injustice even though its current recommendations are impartial. For example, an impartial Observer might be justified in transferring a bottle of Chateau Lafite from a starving peasant who has
never tasted wine to a French oenologist in exchange for a bowl of rice because,
given each's acquired tastes, the exchange increases overall happiness. Because
the historic development of these tastes may have taken place under an unjust regime, some sort of rectification or reparation arguably should be made before an
impartial Observer makes marginal, utility-maximizing changes. The committed
utilitarian would argue that reparations are relevant to his felicific calculus only if
they generate increased happiness for whatever reason, but not solely to satisfy a
theoretical need to rectify past injustice.
In contrast, using the concept of the veil of ignorance eliminates the need to discuss reparations. The veiled representatives view a historically unjust world without knowing who they will be. Because they do not know if they are the former
exploiter or the formerly exploited party, their redistributive decisions will not be
concerned with reparations for past injustices but instead will concentrate on creating a just world for the future. The act of going behind the thin veil of ignorance
and rearranging the world from that perspective thus wipes the slate clean and, in
that sense, rectifies past injustices. See Amdur, Rawls' Theory of Justice: Domestic and InternationalPerspectives,29 WoR=D PoL 438, 455 (1977) (showing of past
exploitation irrelevant to application of maximin). Rectification's irrelevancy is
rooted in the use of the veil of ignorance, not in the decision rule on which the
representatives agree.
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representatives, the delegates would be forced to structure a regime of seabed nodule exploitation as if they knew nothing of the
interests they represent."15 Presumably they would select either
maximin" 6 or average utility maximization" 7 as their decision
rule. As an Ideal Observer, the Committee I delegates would employ a utilitarian decision rule with impartial benevolence.
The following application of these concepts to the seabed nodule problem makes certain assumptions concerning the power of
Committee I to accomplish distributions of wealth. Committee I
certainly has the power to distribute manganese nodules. Further, it is arguable that Committee I has the political power to effect nodule-related redistributions of income, such as the transfer
of technology from developed nations to the Enterprise. Although
115. Cf. Harsanyi, supra note 109, at 598 (arguing that a person can make a

moral decision by making "serious effort" to disregard his personal station in life).
116. The application of maximin is problematic. The primary difficulty is isolating the worst-off (least advantaged) class. Rawls himself notes that this problem
is a "serious difficulty," the solution involving "a certain arbitrariness." J. RAWLS,
supra note 19, at 98. Rawls recognizes the need for a theory of the good here, and
tries to manufacture one that is as neutral as possible, see id. at 395-452, although
it has a strong liberal, individualistic bias. Nagel, supra note 110, at 8-10. In addition, Rawls assumes a world of scarcity in which human wants exceed the means
of satisfaction, J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 4, a realistic but by no means necessary
societal trait. Unless one is willing to stipulate that poor, unskilled workers are
the worst-off class, id. at 78, even though, as Rawls seems to admit, they may be a
happier lot than certain white-collar workers, id. at 93, 409, then maximin seems to
suffer from definitional problems similar to utilitarianism's measurement difficulties discussed at note 117 infra. Rawls unsuccessfully tries to avoid this problem
by constructing an index of primary social goods. See J. RAwLS, supra note 19, at
90-95. Although some commentators have quibbled with his choice of primary
goods, see, e.g., Nagel, supra note 110, at 9, the major problem is in how to use the
index to identify and aid the least advantaged. Rawls concludes that in "doing this
we admittedly rely upon our intuitive capacities," J. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 94,
not unlike what a utilitarian government does.
117. Utilitarianism, however defined, suffers from the well known problems
connected with measuring individuals' preferences and making interpersonal utility comparisons, problems similar to those encountered by maximin in the use of
the index of primary social goods. See note 116 supra. Indeed, interpersonal utility comparisons may be unavoidable in any reasonable theory of morality. See
Harsanyi, supra note 109, at 600; cf. note 110 supra (approximations of interpersonal utility comparisons can be made). A second problem, the "utility glutton,"
affects only traditional utilitarianism (derived independently without the use of
the veil of ignorance). This form of utilitarianism is embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters who get enormously greater gains in utility than others lose
upon a transfer of wealth from them to the monster. R. Nozicic, ANARcmY, STATE,
AwD UTOPIA 41 (1974). A utilitarian decision rule chosen by thinly veiled representatives would avoid this problem because they will see that the glutton exists
and restructure institutions accordingly. If the glutton is allowed to persist, it does
so with everyone's consent.

Committee I has no authority to mandate any other redistributions of wealth, it will be instructive to examine what it would do
if it had such power. For convenience, the following discussion
will use four hypothetical entities: Japan will represent a
wealthy, developed country that uses the minerals; Zamba will
stand for a low income LDC that is also a terrestrial producer; India will signify a terribly impoverished country; and Deepsea will
symbolize a mining consortium incorporated in Japan. Each nation is assumed, for the sake of clarity, to have only one "class,"
so that all citizens in that state will be viewed as being equally
well-off. 1 18 The Committee I delegates qua veiled representatives
do not know whether they represent Japan, Zamba, or India. 119
Actions By Committee I
The most limited task Committee I could undertake would be to
distribute seabed nodules without altering any existing institutions. Under this arrangement, only the Japanese are capable of
mining and processing the nodules, while nodule exploitation
would portend severe revenue losses to Zamba. Because current
institutions are taken as given, Deepsea will not put its capital
into seabed mining without a reasonable certainty of earning an
adequate return on capital.120 In this context Committee I must
apply maximin or utilitarianism to determine whether Deepsea is
entitled to mine the nodules and what should be done with any
excess return.
118. This assumption makes it unnecessary to discuss the problem of internal
redistributions in poor nations that might receive transfers of wealth from richer
nations. For a discussion of this problem see J. TNBERGEN, supra note 91, at 56-57,
211-16. In a world of multi-class nations, the West could embellish its redistributional decision rule to permit its refusal to aid nations that fail to distribute aid to
the needy internally. See Rothstein, Inequality, Exploitation, and Justice in the
InternationalSystem, 21 INT'L STUD. Q. 319, 336-37 (1977); cf. Amdur, supra note
114, at 457 (veiled delegates would demand intervention against donee governments that fail to distribute aid to their worst-off).
119. While this hypothetical employs unitary class nations as proxies for
classes of varying degrees of wealth, in reality neither a utilitarian nor a Rawlsian
would necessarily embrace a world of different nations. In the global setting, it is
unclear whether the worst-off class can be defined by statehood. Because a nation
is a social institution, there is no prima facie reason for assuming that nationstates would even exist in a world structured by thickly veiled representatives.
See B. BARRY, supra note 91, at 133 (representatives may establish "an overriding
international state"). A utilitarian would support the perpetuation of nations only
if it produced a happier world than would other forms of organization. Indeed it
has been generally argued that nations are rapidly losing their relevance, their
boundaries being "highly artificial and anachronistic from any functional perspective." McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, The Protection ofAliensfrom Discrimination
and World Public Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights,
70 AM. J. INT'L L. 432, 439 (1976).
120. Deep Seabed Mining, supra note 18, at 202-03 (B. Gill Clements); id. at 336
(John E. Flipse).
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Under maximin, the decision to allow Deepsea to exploit the
nodules would rest solely on whether the least advantaged, India,
ultimately will benefit from the mining. It is likely that under
present economic conditions Deepsea will earn more than the required return.121 Any excess return could be taxed by a small
regulatory authority and given to India. 122 The revenue loss
Zamba stands to suffer123 would be irrelevant if the loss does not
so severely impoverish Zamba as to make it worse-off than India.
2
The ICNT provisions mandating compensation to Zamba,1 4
therefore, are not required by maximin but stem from personal or
national self-interest in violation of the procedural sense of impartial justice associated with the use of the veil of ignorance.
Utilitarian Committee I delegates (thinly veiled or independently utilitarian) would distribute nodules according to a utilitarian decision rule. A central working assumption of
utilitarianism is that of decreasing marginal utility, that poorer
people derive more utility from an extra dollar than do richer,
more satiated people. It seems reasonable to assume that the
people of India are sufficiently poor to influence the thinly veiled
or independently utilitarian delegates to use seabed nodules to
assist those impoverished lands.125 Because it is assumed in this
section that institutions cannot be altered by Committee I, the
121. See note 32 supra.
122. It is arguable that India's long term expectations would be better served
by the establishment of a socialist, ISA-like entity, because it would set a precedent for similar organs and give impetus to the New World Economic Order.
Given the heavy stress on sovereignty that imbues the NWEO rhetoric, however,
see text accompanying notes 44-51 supra, and the New Order emphasis on compensating Zamba instead of improving the lot of India, see note 114 supra,it is unlikely that India would fare better under ISA, even in the long run, than it would
as the direct recipient of Deepsea's excess profits.
123. See text accompanying notes 29-39 supra.
124. E.g., ICNT, supra note 4, arts. 140, 150.
125. The first thing that would occur to a rational delegate qua thinly veiled
representative is the danger of turning out to be Indian. He would thus do what
he could to improve the situation of Indians, but only to the point at which the
decrease of Japanese and Zambanese quality of life, measured subjectively by
their utility functions, ceased to be compensated for by the improvement of Indian
quality of life. Each quality of life level would be weighted by the delegate according to his chance of emerging from behind the veil of ignorance as a citizen of each
country, that is, according to each nation's population. This procedure simply reflects the maximizing of the average utility of the global population.
Rather than maximizing average utility, traditional utilitarians would maximize
total global utility. Because it is assumed here that the delegates cannot alter institutions affecting world population, the two forms of utilitarianism are identical.
See text accompanying note 112 supra.

available funds would be no more than Deepsea's excess return.
This relatively small sum would all go to India because, even after
the transfer, India would still have a low level of welfare. This
utilitarian outcome would thus be identical to the one mandated
by maximin. 126
Thus, under both maximin and utilitarianism, India would gain
whatever excess return Deepsea earned. Also, Japan would
transfer to India a sum equivalent to the pecuniary benefits it received from seabed mining, such as cheaper minerals, secure supplies, consumer surplus, tax revenues, and balance of payments
savings.12 7 Zamba, however, would be dealt a severe blow. Its
monopoly rents would vanish, while the revenues its obsolete
mines once earned would flow into Deepsea's coffers. There
would thus be a de facto redistribution from low income Zamba
through Deepsea and Japan to destitute India. This sort of solution is typical of maximin, which focuses solely on helping the
least advantaged class while failing to consciously alter relationships among better-off classes. A utilitarian Committee I would
reach the same result, but only because it is constrained from altering global institutions.
In reality, Committee I may have some limited political power
to redistribute wealth in connection with its construction of a seabed regime. For example, it might mandate transfers of technology to LDCs either directly or via the ISA.128 Applying maximin,
Committee I could compel a transfer of technology from Deepsea
to India, but not to Zamba, in order to permit least-advantaged In126. Harsanyi has argued that "in most situations Rawls' theory will have much
the same policy implications as utilitarian theory does." Harsanyi, supra note 109,
at 605. Indeed, he conceives of maximin as an admissible approximation of the
utilitarian outcome in many cases. Id. at 606. He prefers utilitarianism nevertheless because in the few cases in which the results diverge, Rawls' maximin "consistently yields morally highly unacceptablepolicy conclusions whereas utilitarian
theory consistently yields morally fully acceptable ones.. . ." Id. at 605. The extension of maximin from its use in distributing nodules to its employment as the
basis of a regime for redistributing global wealth is, quite probably, precisely such
an unacceptable use. See text accompanying notes 129-32 infra.
127. This would moot the congressional debate concerning whether the unilateral mining legislation should require domestic nodule processing and U.S. construction and documentation of vessels used in mining operations because any
gains accruing to the U.S. would have to be quantified and transferred to India.
For a brief discussion of the debate, see the testimony of Ambassador Elliot L.
Richardson before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee
on International Organizations and Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade (Nov. 1, 1979) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
128. Although the questions of nodule entitlements and technology transfer
often are discussed together, they actually are quite distinct. The problem of nodule entitlements closely resembles a question of initial allocation, while that of
technology transfer concerns redistributing previously titled wealth, albeit for use
in exploiting currently untitled resources.
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dia to mine the seabed wealth on its own. Alternatively, the Committee could establish an ISA-like entity both to receive the initial
nodule entitlements and to channel this new wealth to India.
These redistributions by transfer of technology are separate from
the de facto redistributions from Zamba to India effected by seabed mining itself. Similarly, the utilitarian solution would approximate the maximin-dictated result by redistributing some wealth
from Deepsea to impoverished India according to the assumption
of the decreasing marginal utility of income.
Redistribution of Global Wealth
If Committee I had the political power to effect a legal regime
mandating redistributions of global wealth far more radical than
transfers of technology, it would still apply the impartial decision
rules of maximin or utilitarianism. In this broader context, however, maximin assumes more radical dimensions. Compliance
with maximin would compel extensive transfers from both Japan
and Zamba to India until there was equality or until further redistributions would decrease Japanese productive incentives so as to
make India worse-off.129 In today's world, Japan would have tremendous difficulty arguing that a large Japan-India income gap
30
works ultimately to India's favor.1
Even if India were so desperately poor that everything Japan
and Zamba could be induced to produce would still leave India
and, consequently, Japan and Zamba, pathetically poor, these redistributions nevertheless would be required.131 Maximin's exclusive focus on the level of well-being of the worst-off class 32
requires society to make all sacrifices that help improve that
class's lot irrespective of the overall effect those redistributive
transfers have on global happiness. One argument for this star129. J. RAW-S, supra note 19, at 78, 150.
130. See Amdur, supra note 114, at 454-55.
131. Rawls at times speaks of deviating from his principles when a certain minimum level of well-being has not been reached. J. RAwis, supra note 19, at 152,
542. However, he does not mitigate the application of maximin but only permits
the representatives to forego some liberty and justice in order to reach a minimum
standard of economic well-being. Id. at 150-52, 302-03.
132. "Using the maximin principle in the original [veiled] position is equivalent
to assigning unity or near-unity probability to the possibility that one may end up
as the worst-off individual in society. .. " Harsanyi, supra note 109, at 599. There
seems to be no rational reason for doing so. Id.

tling result is that equal poverty is preferable to unjustified
wealth distinctions.
A global redistribution that maximizes average utility would
differ markedly from that dictated by maximin. This divergence
occurs once India reaches an acceptable level of welfare, as determined by the Indians' subjective utility function weighted by the
likelihood that the delegate would emerge as an Indian. At this
point there would be no reason to continue transferring wealth to
India. Whereas maximin would focus on India's absolute level of
well-being, utilitarianism would focus on differences of utility that
various wealth transfers achieve. While maximin unrelentlessly
would propel society toward equality, utilitarianism would apply
the brakes when the move toward equality reduced production incentives so as to cause a decrease in average global utility.
Thus, if one had the full freedom to redistribute global wealth
according to a utilitarian decision rule, seabed nodules themselves might be treated differently than they were in the more restrictive scenarios discussed in the previous section. Although
Deepsea's capital probably can generate an equally adequate return at other uses, 133 the obsolesced Zambanese miners may not

have alternative jobs. If seabed mining causes the foregone
Zambanese labor value to exceed Deepsea's excess return, the
nodules should remain on the seabed, while Deepsea employs its
capital elsewhere and the Zambanese terrestrial miners continue
to toil. India would continue receiving appropriate transfer payments out of the general pool of world wealth, and global wealth
would be as great as justice permits.
It follows from a global utilitarian analysis that the delegates
would bar Zambanese threats to cartelize or place an embargo on
the relevant minerals 3 4 because such disruptions would decrease
world wealth. Moreover, Zamba, having already received its fair
share of wealth from the delegates, would be unable to retain any
cartel-derived monopoly profits. Under present law, however, the
Zambanese stand to gain by cartelization even if it decreases
overall world well-being. This result, which arguably is irrational
from a global perspective, is "legal" because public international
law is not based on moral or rational considerations but primarily
35
on power politics and rhetoric in international fora.1
133.
134.
135.
seabed

See note 120 supra.
Cf. note 31 supra (discussing threats to cartelize).
Cf. text accompanying notes 56-79 supra (discussion of law concerning
manganese nodules).
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FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

A duty to distribute nodules and other forms of wealth impartially would be only one component of an overall scheme of global
justice. Intergenerational utility, for example, might be maxinized by creating a duty on the part of each person or nation not
to leave the world poorer than he found it.136 This duty might be
manifested in a requirement that LDCs avoid self-debilitation by
enacting strict birth control measures and internal development
programs. 37 Another component of a scheme of global justice
concerns rules permitting wealthy nations to retain invested
wealth for a certain amount of time provided that after the expiration of this time the appropriate amount of wealth (as determined
by the veiled delegates or Impartial Observer) created by the investments trickles down to the poor. Similar timing rules might
be required to govern internal redistributions in donee countries
because arguably both utility maximization and maximizing the
prospects of the worst-off require initial concentrations of wealth
to facilitate economic development. 38 Strict rules, however, must
guarantee the required redistribution of this wealth.

136. Cf. B. ACKEdmAN, SocIAL JUSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE 202-04 (1980) (elders obliged to preserve enough wealth so next generation can receive initial endowment at least as large as endowment with which elders began life).
137. Besides arguably being required by a utilitarian or "Ackermanian" framework, this sort of duty might be required even in a Rawlsian world. See Amdur,
supra note 114, at 456-57 (for global maximin meaningfully to achieve maximum
prospects for worst-off class, affluent states must be able to tie aid to demands that
recipient governments reduce internal population growth). Rawls believes that
the current generation has a duty not only to maintain global wealth but to accumulate wealth for the next generation. J. RAwLs, supra note 19, at 284-93. However, his argument that the veiled delegates would select such a principle is most
unpersuasive. See, e.g., B. BARRY, supra note 91, at 131 n.2.
138. See A. ATKINSON, .supranote 94, at 250.

